Showing posts with label Britain. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Britain. Show all posts

Monday, July 20, 2026

Trumpism is our Brexit

Watching the British transition to a new governing Labour Party prime minister from afar, I had what is probably a very obvious insight about this country which seems worth musing on.

First the disclaimer: I know very little about British politics and the broad stroke observations that follow may be inaccurate. I only dare write this because the actual subject is our, American, political follies -- and those I know plenty about.

Andy Burnham's takeover as Prime Minister makes him the seventh person in the top British job in the last ten years. And there is overwhelming agreement that his country is not serving its citizens as well as they wish it would. There's a housing crisis; there's a health care mess; international standing is precarious; racial tensions are unremitting; and "affordability" seems a mirage. The level of government turnover suggests the political landscape is both full of pratfalls and beset with confusion.

From across the pond, it seems obvious that the passionate, the successful exercise of popular sovereignty that was the the narrow 2016 vote to leave the European Union has been a sad wrong turn. Without Europe, Britain is poorer and weaker and the governments trying to manage national assertion within economic and intellectual isolation have been feckless failures. They can't satisfy anyone. The majority of Brits seem to think that Brexit was a mistake; and also they don't want to jump back into heated controversy over it. That hurt. There's a sharp age difference among the people: 

It may also be, as one British pollster observed, that the 2016 majority for Brexit “has literally died out,” since the Leave camp at the time included a disproportionate number of elderly voters. And so the conversation in Britain is shifting to what can be done to reverse the damage ...

Sound familiar ... ?

There's flooding in Texas, there's strife in Iran ... Apologies to the Kingston Trio
Like the Brexiteers, the Trumpists in power destroy without building. Stick that old crank JFK Jr at Health and Human Services, throw out the scientists, and you get a cyclosporiasis epidemic. Two cheers for the microbes! Empower Russell Vought at the Office of Management and Budget and government ceases to be able to do its job. MAGA cheers while emergency management is cut until no one answers the phone as flood waters rise.

Like the Brits, when the American people shrug off our impulse to destroy government without building (I think largely we do this so as not to have to deal with brown people ...), reconstruction is going to be tough. You can't stop the clock and you certainly can't go backwards. When people experience Trump's grafting minions, his anti-science religious know-nothings, and the gloating of our domestic oligarchs, we don't like it. The reaction will and should be extreme.

I trust we'll take government back. The federal system and the country's vast wealth gives us a fighting chance to pull out of our Trumpist national nosedive into self-pity, perhaps more smoothly than the Brits. But what are we going to do with our chances?

Monday, May 25, 2026

Does the character of leaders matter?

Phillips P. O'Brien's The Strategists: Churchill, Stalin, Roosevelt, Mussolini, and Hitler--How War Made Them and How They Made War approaches the history of what Americans call World War II from an angle that I found counter-intuitive. Studying history, I've absorbed the lesson that most of what happened in human societies had less of its origins in the foibles of individuals than in wide economic and intellectual forces which shaped the possible. But, of course, people with power play out their times in the terrain which those forces make possible. This book is O'Brien's whack at how five strong leaders shaped their European war.

And it's a delicious volume, human stories smoothly recounted and convincingly deconstructed on the landscape observed by a student of military history and international relations. I had been reading O'Brien's indispensable substack on the Ukraine war and wanted to explore his scholarship. This makes an easy introduction.

For the purposes of this book, the strategic decision is the choice by the leader, with or without the opinions of advisers, of the strategic plan that the state should follow. The implementation is the translation of that plan into action. ... One of the great tests of grand-strategic leadership is learning what not to do as well as what to do.
O'Brien's subjects were two men born in the 1870s (Stalin, Churchill) and three in the 1880s (Roosevelt, Mussolini, Hitler). They were all, in some sense, survivors. 

Stalin clawed his way through prison under the Tsar, civil war, and Bolshevik revolution to make himself the unchallengable ruler of the Soviet Union by 1930. He was something of an unlikely successor to that more complex and brilliant revolutionary, Vladimir Lenin:
Stalin’s fundamental problem was that he was not competent enough to fulfill the purposes of his command. ... You can work very hard to create the reality you want, and with enough power you can often succeed. ... Playing up the idea of a vast conspiracy of traitors in their midst ... helped Stalin appeal to Lenin. He might not have been terribly competent, but he would take extreme measures to protect the Leninist line against all possible enemies—even those who were not enemies yet. Lenin approved of Stalin’s willingness to use the most brutal means against possible enemies, even when he was aware Stalin was making things up. ...
Churchill traveled around the British empire as a young privileged adventurer, then took up political party politics, and got himself appointed in 1914 as First Lord of the Admiralty in time to be held responsible for the British/Australian landing in Turkey which ended in a massacre. More to his credit, he also used his position to inspect the trench warfare in France and took enduring lessons:
Churchill now understood that modern weapons had made a mockery of bravery. Machines would determine the outcome of this war, and exposing oneself was more likely to lead to injury or death than anything else. ... If he had retained many boyish traits when the war started, the man that returned to London was more sober, cautious and methodical in his strategic outlook. He now had a holistic war strategy that stretched from the production of weapons to the deployment of forces in the field, all underlined by a coherent geopolitical vision.
O'Brien skims only lightly over the personal crisis of which Roosevelt was a survivor. During World War I he worked for the Wilson administration in the Department of the Navy and came away with an understanding of how controlling the oceans might be America's great strength. He was a political up-and-comer, the Democratic vice-presidential candidate on a losing 1920 ticket. And then he barely survived polio and emerged with paralyzed legs. Despite this seemingly insurmountable setback, he won the governorship of New York State in 1928 and then the presidency in 1932, in time to confront the Depression depths of bank failures and mass unemployment. But he also repudiated his non-militarist foreign policy positions.
During a time of financial hardship and growing military threats in both Europe and Asia, Roosevelt’s agenda strengthened the US Navy while providing desperately needed industrial jobs in shipyards up and down the country. It would be the start of Roosevelt’s military preparations for World War II, and would reveal the enduring legacy of his earlier experiences.
The three who became the leaders of the Allied powers had held responsible, although subordinate, positions during World War I; the two Axis dictators had been ordinary soldiers in the Great War. 

O'Brien manages no respect at all for Mussolini. Of these five men, I had known the least about the Italian fascist, so will quote at some length.
Making Italy great, and himself even greater, would be his foundational strategic mindset—even if he had as of yet no clear idea [in 1918] how to achieve it. ...
... Much of the time within the narrative of World War I, the Italian experience is overlooked in favour of the great battles of the Western and even Eastern Fronts. Yet by Western Front standards, the Italian soldier made an equal, and in some ways greater, sacrifice to that of his British and French comrades. By the end of the war, five million Italians had served in the armed forces, and 650,000 of them had died (or would soon perish because of war-received wounds) 
... trincerocrazia (rule by those who had served in the trenches) would form the core of a “new and better elite” which [Mussolini] claimed should rule Italy after the war. Of course, he was too modest to point out that a prominent newspaper editor who had served in the army would be ideally suited to lead this new trench-ocracy. Mussolini was coming closer and closer to arguing for an overthrow of the Italian state. The journey to a personal dictatorship was shortening. ...
Mussolini had a prescription for regaining Italy's imagined former military greatness.
He said the Germans had made a terrible mistake going on the defensive on the Western Front in 1917, as this was actually “more expensive” than going on the offensive. How anyone who had witnessed how machine guns and modern artillery could devastate attacking infantrymen could still think the defensive was more expensive boggles the mind. However, instilling the right values remained to Mussolini the key to preparing soldiers to advance. 
... In the balance between morale and equipment, willpower always triumphed over steel. Mussolini was “certain that thousands of cannons and machine guns are not enough for victory, if the spirit of the soldiers is lacking.”
Having posed the question of Italian "greatness," he made himself the answer for attaining it after that war.
If the Allies had unfairly thwarted Italy at Paris [in the Versailles Treaty], Mussolini would be the man to make Italy great again. He created his own political movement in the midst of this supposed humiliation ... In November 1921 the Fascist Party itself was founded with Mussolini as its leader, and in 1922 he seized power over all of Italy. It was the culmination of his wartime learning. 
Mussolini viewed the Italian state, not insensibly, as too weak and chaotic to save itself. He thus threatened a march on Rome more as an act of bluster than any widespread violent action. Indeed, he was prepared to call the whole thing off if the government reacted with force. Luckily for him they didn’t, and the indecisive King was only too happy to invite Mussolini to take power to end the chaos. Il Duce was made. 
World War I had taught Mussolini how to seize and manipulate power, and the value of acting like a great power even if you were not one. The only trouble with this strategic outlook would come if someone called Mussolini’s bluff.
The rest of O'Brien's account of Mussolini's role in World War II amounts to how Churchill and then Hitler did indeed call the Italian's bluff. Italian fighters executed their deposed dictator in 1945.

Despite having been born in Austria, Adolf Hitler volunteered as a lowly dispatch courier for the Germans in the Great War. And according to to O'Brien, Hitler got lucky, suffering a minor wound that kept him out of the worst of the German rout and killing fields, while leaving some indelible impressions. 
Hitler’s wound, in the thigh, was relatively light, but he was pulled off the line and sent to a military hospital near Berlin. Once there, due to the vagaries of military bureaucracy as much as anything, he would wait approximately six months before returning to the Western Front. Hitler was shocked by what he discovered in Germany. Instead of a people united in support for the war, he came face to face with widespread dissatisfaction, even defeatism, in both the army and the general public. 
Though his doubts about the true resilience of the German people remained, he did not want to admit that Germans might honestly doubt that this miserable war, which had already killed hundreds of thousands and brought misery and famine to their doorstep, was a mistake. No, the real culprit had to be the Jews. In his fact-free world, the Jews had used the war to embed their domination throughout the production process and to stoke animosity between Bavaria and Prussia, all the while skillfully avoiding military service themselves.
He did take one practical if over-blown lesson from his war experience:
Hitler had a much greater focus on the importance of military equipment in determining the outcome of modern battles. ... Hitler’s fascination with the largest, heaviest firepower reveals something common in dictators: a stress on strength, without a corresponding ability to understand rational trade-offs. ...
Hitler's wartime service convinced him that he had found his destiny:
... To answer the question of why [the 1918 German] disaster had occurred, Hitler fell back on the conspiracy theories he had been nursing for years and magnified them to enormous proportions. An internal, criminal enemy had poisoned the mind of the German people, leading them to betray the valiant troops at the front and transforming a possible war-winning situation into a humiliating defeat. 
This is the crucial piece of the puzzle in understanding Hitler as a war leader in World War II. It combined his grasp of how to win wars (heavy equipment based on German technology which carried the biggest punch possible) with how Germany lost this one (home front weakened and then betrayed by evil influences—particularly Jews). 
The combination of these ideas also seems to have been the motivation he needed to change professions. If Hitler went into the army in 1914 still thinking he would become a great artist or architect, by 1918 he had decided to immerse himself in politics. 
Having explored the life lessons these five men brought to World War II, O'Brien's actual recounting of the events of that war is more sparse. Pretty much all of them acted in accord with pre-existing character. 
Hitler, whose ego was already massive, started telling people that everything now depended on him and him alone, and that he needed to act in case he died early and Germany was deprived of his historic leadership. ...
Hitler's war became a parade of strategic failures for Germany. 

On the other hand --
After December 7, 1941, neither Franklin Roosevelt nor Winston Churchill had any doubts about the outcome of World War II. They were both convinced that Germany, Italy and Japan would all be crushed. ... Their earlier experiences with war had taught both Roosevelt and Churchill the vital importance of controlling the air-sea super-battlefield—and in that way they had a massive advantage over Adolf Hitler, with his more parochial war and life experiences.
The Russian ruler was the one who learned and adapted most over the course of the war. Because Stalin enjoyed the material support of Britain and the United States and led a country where war had evoked patriotic nationalism, he had time and opportunity to learn to be a successful war leader. 
Stalin’s meeting with [Roosevelt's envoy] Harry Hopkins was just one example of how he reacted to adversity not by doubling down on his own brilliance, but by trying to cultivate and benefit from the support of others. This was not because of any change of personality; it was because he had calculated, accurately, that the chances of his personal survival and that of the USSR (and then later of their further successes) would be better assured by taking help where he could get it, even if this showed him doing things that ideologically or personally he had not done before. ... Stalin had the capacity to learn. In 1941 and early 1942, Hitler and Stalin were quite similar as military commanders. ... 
When Stalin let his generals lead, with Allied materiel arriving, the immense size and valor of the Russian army came into play and turned the tide against Germany. Stalin learned.

O'Brien faults Roosevelt for not being willing to face his own mortality and for failing to prepare his vice president Harry Truman. From having been an anchor of stability, Roosevelt risked the final success of the alliance. 
Though one does not want to analyse Roosevelt’s psyche too much, part of him seemed to believe that, as long as he was president, he could not really die. ... in 1944, Roosevelt would make one of the most selfish choices in international relations history, something so profoundly self-centred that historians still shy away from addressing it. He not only decided to run for office while dying; he decided to change vice president to someone he did not like, would not confide in and would not prepare in any way to be president. ... 
... In refusing to provide the US government with an idea of concrete war aims and purposes, Roosevelt was making a mockery of the Clausewitzian notion of strategy being a connection between ends, ways and means. Roosevelt, more than any war leader, had a clear idea of ways and means—fighting the war with air-sea power and many machines over soldiers, etc.—but [these] seemed disconnected from the ends. The ends were what he wanted at any given moment. 
... By the end of the war, three of the five were dead: Hitler by suicide, Mussolini gunned down on a street corner and Roosevelt whose body failed after all his exertions. Even the two survivors, Churchill and Stalin, had aged greatly because of the stress of war leadership. Neither was the same forceful figure after the war that he had been when it started.
O'Brien concludes by arguing in favor of greater focus in historical accounts on the character and capacities of leaders. (Yes, now as then, that seems forever to mean all men.) I greatly enjoyed this book; it rounded my understanding of massive events which I've studied through other lenses. But I wonder -- is this truly the best way to greater understanding?
... grand strategy in World War II was far more personal than we might believe. ... then, now and in the future—we have to try to understand the minds of the individual leaders who make the crucial choices. Though we use phrases like “national interest” or “greater good,” these are abstract concepts in grand-strategy-making. Hitler, Stalin, Mussolini, Churchill and Roosevelt had very personal notions of what national interest was; in some cases, notions that led to the lives of their fellow citizens being made far worse. All of them also believed that they were personally indispensable in terms of making their countries greater, and all imposed their own visions on their states during the course of the war. As such, they regularly acted like their personal views of the world were in the national interest of their countries, when they were decidedly not. If we want to understand strategy, we must also understand the strategist.
Perhaps. Certainly any contemporary American is forced to see what horrors a leader with no moral character at all can lead to.

Saturday, May 09, 2026

Hope and affordable housing or demolition?

And now for some observations from somebody else's elections. Britain has just come through a round of local votes and the results seem to imply big changes in how that country's democracy might function in the next decade.

The New York Times summarizes:

... Millions of Britons voted in elections to Parliaments in Scotland and Wales, and to municipalities in England. And they delivered a damning verdict on [Prime Minister] Starmer’s governing Labour Party. ... [Labour is analogous to our Democratic Party; it has a large majority of the seats in Parliament which means its elected leader runs the government.]

The main victor on Thursday was the right-wing populist Reform U.K. party [Britain's MAGA], which gained more than 1,400 seats on municipal councils across England. The party took seats from the Conservative Party and from Labour and consolidated its status as the dominant party of Britain’s political right. But the left-wing Green Party also made gains at the expense of Labour. 

The results shattered the grip on power long held by Labour and the Conservative [Party], and signaled a new political landscape in which at least seven parties are vying for votes across Britain.

Although this complicated set of local elections won't mean the end of the central Labour government for now, clearly something's stirring -- and even looking from the US, this seems to mark a significant political shakeup -- something bigger than the fact that Starmer seems a literally unappealing leader.

The British left-wing political blog Another Angry Voice, by Thomas G. Clark, has lots to say about the apparent crack up in British politics, one section of which might seem highly familiar to us in the U.S. 

What did we learn from the 2026 elections?... Demographics 

This topic always provokes fury from the "not all boomers" brigade, but it’s absolutely undeniable now.

The biggest determining factor in how people used to vote in the 20th Century was social class. The biggest determining factor in how people vote these days is age.

If only the votes of working age people were counted, the results would be very different, with the Greens, Labour, and the Lib-Dems faring dramatically better.

If only pensioners votes were counted, we’d be looking at even more massive Reform gains.

... The working age population want some hope; and affordable housing; and decent wages; and workers rights; and investment economics. The boomers want a [radical fascist Nigel] Farage-style demolition job on the last remnants of the post-war [welfare state]settlement. You know, the mixed economy economic conditions that made them the richest generation ever.

Their parents’ generation fought in WWII to stop the extreme-right, now they’re absolutely gagging for the extreme-right to tear down the last remnants of the post-war legacy that their parents’ generation left them.

It’s not all of them, but it’s a huge percentage of them. ...

Makes me wonder how much of the strength of MAGA can similarly be largely attributed to Donald Trump's (and my) age cohort. 

The Pew Research Center provides some suggestive data from 2024. They explicitly include both people who are willing to say they identify with a US political party and also those whose lean toward one or the other; lots of voters claim independence, but actually possess a persistent lean as a consequence of the system offering election after election with only two choices.

Age, generational cohorts and party identification 
Today, age is strongly associated with partisanship – and this pattern has been in place for more than a decade.

The Democratic Party holds a substantial edge among younger voters, while the Republican Party has the advantage among the oldest groups.
    •    About two-thirds of voters ages 18 to 24 (66%) associate with the Democratic Party, compared with 34% who align with the GOP.
    •    There is a similarly large gap in the partisan affiliation of voters ages 25 to 29 (64% are Democrats or lean that way vs. 32% for Republicans).
    •    Voters in their 30s also tilt Democratic, though to a lesser extent: 55% are Democrats or Democratic leaners, 42% are Republicans or Republican leaners.

Neither party has a significant edge over the other among voters in their 40s and 50s:
    •    Half of voters in their 40s associate with the Democratic Party, and 47% are affiliated with the Republican Party.
    •    The shares are reversed among voters in their 50s: 50% align with the Republicans, 47% with the Democrats.

Among voters ages 60 and older, the GOP holds a clear advantage:
    •    Republican alignment is 10 percentage points higher than Democratic alignment (53% vs. 43%) among voters in their 60s.
    •    Voters ages 70 to 79 are slightly more likely to be aligned with the GOP (51%) than the Democratic Party (46%). [Might this slight counter trend show we were 1960s rebels once?]
    •    About six-in-ten voters 80 and older (58%) identify with or lean toward the GOP, while 39% associate with the Democratic Party.
As some Brits might say, we too have a boomer problem ... Since older people are more likely to vote than young people, these differences have powerful consequences.

My cohort of progressive boomers do our bit by working to encourage the younger folks to participate!

Wednesday, September 04, 2024

Tumultuous political failure

Rory Stewart is brilliant, charming, singular, and thoroughly obnoxious. His memoir, How Not to Be a Politician, would not be to many reader's taste, but I found it fun and informative.

Stewart is a Brit/Scot from an upper class professional family. I first became aware of Stewart when he served in various military and administrative roles among Brits allied in our Iraq and Afghanistan wars in the '00s -- and became a smart and vocal critic of the U.S. occupation's absurdities and dysfunction. As well he might have -- before these wars, he had famously walked across Iraq, Pakistan, India, Afghanistan and Nepal. He knew something about these people and places, unlike the North American bumblers with the guns and his own British politicians.

On returning home, he decided he needed to do something about all this. In 2010, he declared himself a Tory (that's the Conservative Party) and through luck and accident managed to win the opportunity to contest and win the remote district of Penrith and the Border adjacent to Scotland. He was now a Member of Parliament. Through a series of kerfuffles, policy controversies, and administrative misadventures, he survived as a Tory Member through 2019 when he ran for party leadership in a failed effort to avert a Boris Johnson government and a chaotic implementation of Brexit.

The policy strands of this memoir are what political memoirs usually center on, concerns like rural development in his isolated home constituency, an effort to extricate Britain from America's Middle Eastern wars, whether to leave the European Union via Brexit, and once his Remain position lost the popular referendum, how to carry out the people's will with the least damage to the country.

That's all important, but what made this an interesting account for me was his picture of how the accreted quasi-system that is Britain's unwritten political constitution was functioning. Not well. Now -- Americans have nothing to crow about as we struggle to preserve popular democracy within a written Constitutional framework constrained by such immovable absurdities as the Electoral College and the rule that every state gets two Senators regardless of the size of its population. But Stewart argues convincingly that British government is even more irrational.

He recounts his orientation to his new job from his Party legislative leader:
We should not regard debates as opportunities for open discussion; we might be called legislators but we were not intended to overly scrutinize legislation ... 'I always try to get consensus as chief whip,' the chief whip concluded, 'and the consensus is that the prime minister is right.'
... Even the most rebellious MPs, famous for their obstreperousness, voted against the government in perhaps only five votes out of a hundred. All of which raised certain questions about the theory that MPs were independent legislators ...
Finding that his job as a backbencher was to be an automaton, Stewart worked on improving the lives of his constituents (notably by increasing broadband in the countryside) and finagled to get into one of the junior ministerial positions open to MPs. In this respect the system is very different from the United States.

Ambitious Members from the governing party are chosen by the prime minister to exercise executive authority in the various departments of government. But unlike cabinet members in the U.S. who genuinely attempt to direct the departments to which they are appointed by presidents, MPs continue as legislators; their sub-cabinet and cabinet appointments are add-ons. No particular expertise in the actual work -- such as preserving the environment, running prisons, or foreign aid -- is expected or required to become a minor minister. In fact, expertise was the reverse of what was sought; Conservative leaders sure didn't want Stewart having any authority over anything about Afghanistan or central Asia where he knew the ropes and the languages.

Stewart quickly learned that the permanent civil servants, accurately, figured that uninterested junior ministers came and went and could be ignored, politely. He recounts perhaps instituting some interesting reforms in the under-funded, under-appreciated prison system -- until he was abruptly moved on. Insofar as Stewart is fair and accurate, this seems a hell of an undemocratic way to run a government.

The stresses of governing after the destabilizing Brexit vote eventually did in Conservative Prime Minister Theresa May; ushered in the frivolous, self-aggrandizing leadership of Boris Johnson; and led through short prime ministerial tenures to this year's resounding replacement of the Tories with a Labour government. By then, Stewart was long gone. But his account of the early stages of the Tory self-immolation is cutting.
[In 2019] for eight and a half years, the government had been an elective dictatorship run by the prime minister, and Parliament an elderly, smelly Labrador, asleep by the fire. Once a year, perhaps, someone would step so hard on our tail that we would snap, and in doing so stop the redesigning of the House of Lords, or the Syria bombing; but generally we were entirely passive. We, the Conservative MPs voted loyally for the government day in and day out, late into the night.
But Brexit had transformed the conventions of British politics. The generally loyal, if grumpy, mass of Conservative MPs had been turned into warring Brexiteers and Remainers. ...
... authority was leaching away from all of us. The referendum, by giving a direct say to the general public, had made Parliament a low-lying island in a rough and rising sea. And many of the people, having 'spoken', began to perceive parliamentary debates and votes as just different forms of obfuscation, delay and betrayal.  ...
When the Party deposed Theresa May, Stewart felt he had to run for leadership because the more obvious candidates would not dare to state what to him was obvious:
... none of them was prepared to say that Boris Johnson was manifestly unsuitable to be prime minister. ... to put an egotistical character like Boris Johnson in the heart of a system that was already losing its dignity, restraint and seriousness was to invite catastrophe...
Stewart was proved right, of course. Often being right does not lead to popularity. 

His memoir has a supercilious tone that I am sure was endlessly grating to his colleagues. The guy is the opposite of a team player. He comes across as pretty sure he knows it all -- and sometimes he does. But the result is an delicious record of tumultuous political failure. I'm glad to have read it.

Friday, September 09, 2022

The Queen passes

While cleaning out my parents' house 20 years ago, I came across this card -- a keepsake from Queen Elizabeth's coronation year of 1952. Mother was an Anglophile and one of the royalist Americans. The British monarchy was defined for her by its steely performance of patriotic perseverance during World War II. Elizabeth II was the teenager who trained as an auto mechanic during that war. Her coronation was the first TV I remember seeing -- my parents' marveling at the grainy live broadcast from Westminster Abbey -- boring processions of people in strange clothes it seemed to me, but still marvelous. As Elizabeth aged, Mother admired her stamina. Mother knew a thing or two about stamina herself. The monarchy doesn't much suit the contemporary world. Will Charles III be able to continue her myth-sustaining performance?

Tuesday, June 28, 2022

The residue of Brexit

Six years on, The Guardian revisits Brexit, Britains' messy divorce via referendum from the European Common Market and the project of a united Europe. The article is long and detailed but paints a convincing picture of Brexit failure.

On 23 June 2016, Geoffrey Betts, the managing director of a small office supplies business in Marlow, Buckinghamshire, had high hopes for his firm, and the British economy, when he voted for Brexit. 
“I thought we would be like … ‘here we go, here we go. We are going to become the most competitive country in Europe and we are going to be encouraging business.’ Now I think: ‘What have we done?’” 
His firm, Stewart Superior, has survived, but not without major restructuring and huge efforts to get around obstacles that Brexit has put in the way of the export side of the business.
For a lot of people in Britain, Brexit isn't working out as they were promised and had hoped. Add in the global pandemic, and the economy became mired in doldrums.


I've been convinced that the flat out insane vote for Brexit was the product of a creaky, elitist, oblivious political system that had delivered the poisonous Iraq war and a generation defining economic crash during the 2000s, but couldn't provide constructive leadership or widely shared prosperity to many Britons. (Yes ... that has all too much in common with the conditions that elected Donald Trump in the same year.)
Six years after the referendum which took the UK out of the EU, the economic case for Brexit is proving increasingly difficult for its supporters – including inside the Conservative party – to make. 
The impression was that there would be no downside. We would thrive outside Europe’s bureaucracy which was strangling our companies with red tape. The huge benefits of the single market – trading freely across borders, with common standards – were never highlighted by Vote Leave, and rarely by the crudely alarmist Remain camp, either. 
Only now, with the worst of the pandemic (probably) behind us, and ministers unable to blame Covid, is Brexit reality being laid bare. Next year the OECD calculates that the UK will record the lowest growth in the G20 with the exception of Russia whose economy is being drained by its war on Ukraine.
Going it alone attracted a slim majority of British voters in 2016. It now seems the Boris Johnson's Conservative Party may finally pay a price for the drag that Brexit is exerting on British well-being. Last week the Tories lost two special elections in areas they had controlled.

But, as in the United States, the damage inflicted on the national edifice by an impulsive vote by frustrated people will be hard to recover from.

Friday, February 14, 2020

Friday cat blogging and a little Reformation cat history

Morty is tired these days; he enjoys his naps.
...
As a bonus to today's cat blogging, here's another tidbit picked up from The Reformation: A History by Diarmaid MacCulloch. In 1645, William Laud, the archbishop of Canterbury, lost his head -- literally -- in one of the twists and turns of that great political and theological struggle which was the English Civil War. Laud's version of an Anglican compromise between full-on Reformed Calvinism and Roman Catholic papism couldn't stand in a time when it was allied with an unskilled, unpopular monarch, Charles I -- who also lost his head. Laud promoted the ascendancy of bishops, ceremony in church ritual, and was raised up as a martyr of the faith once the tide of Puritan rebellion receded.

MacCulloch is gently caustic about Laud but appreciates one of the man's virtues.

Laud was prominent in a royal regime that after 1629 ceased to trouble itself with meeting Parliament and instead tried to sort out England's problems with royal proclamations ...

Laud had a reputation for being kindhearted to the poor, and he showed engaging affection for his pet cats and his giant tortoise (a beast that survived all the subsequent upheavals at Lambeth Palace until it was accidentally killed by a gardener in the mid-eighteenth century.) ... His orderly mind and humorless dedication appealed to King Charles, another self-contained little man; between them they showed no awareness that they might need to inspire popular enthusiasm for the innovations in religion they now foisted on a horrified Church of England. ...

In the Laudians' zeal to make worship and church interiors more holy, they offended against long-standing silent understandings of religious behavior. They even tried to stop people bringing their dogs to church. The English were already a nation of dog enthusiasts if not dog lovers, and they tolerated dogs in church on the same basis as children, as long as both groups behaved themselves. There was much fury among churchgoers at the cat-loving archbishop's intolerance. ...

Dog people against cat people -- from such divisions are deadly polarizations launched.

Previous posts in my The Reformation: A History series:
The Reformation: Islamophobia and a slavery past
The subversive weapon of the Reformation: musical propaganda

Tuesday, November 20, 2018

Explanation of the Brexit process through the medium of cake



LEAVER: I want an omelette.
REMAINER: Right. It’s just we haven’t got any eggs.
LEAVER: Yes, we have. There they are. [HE POINTS AT A CAKE]
REMAINER: They’re in the cake.
LEAVER: Yes, get them out of the cake, please.
REMAINER: But we voted in 1974 to put them into a cake.
LEAVER: Yes, but that cake has got icing on it. Nobody said there was going to be icing on it.
REMAINER: Icing is good.
LEAVER: And there are raisins in it. I don’t like raisins. Nobody mentioned raisins. I demand another vote.

DAVID CAMERON ENTERS.
DAVID CAMERON: OK.
DAVID CAMERON SCARPERS.
LEAVER: Right, where’s my omelette?
REMAINER: I told you, the eggs are in the cake.
LEAVER: Well, get them out.

EU: It’s our cake.

JEREMY CORBYN: Yes, get them out now.
REMAINER: I have absolutely no idea how to get them out. Don’t you know how to get them out?
LEAVER: Yes! You just get them out and then you make an omelette.
REMAINER: But how?! Didn’t you give this any thought?
LEAVER: Saboteur! You’re talking eggs down. We could make omelettes before the eggs went into the cake, so there’s no reason why we can’t make them now.

THERESA MAY: It’s OK, I can do it.
REMAINER: How?
THERESA MAY: There was a vote to remove the eggs from the cake, and so the eggs will be removed from the cake.
REMAINER: Yeah, but…
LEAVER: Hang on, if we take the eggs out of the cake, does that mean we don’t have any cake? I didn’t say I didn’t want the cake, just the bits I don’t like.

EU: It’s our cake.

REMAINER: But you can’t take the eggs out of the cake and then still have a cake.
LEAVER: You can. I saw the latest Bake Off and you can definitely make cakes without eggs in them. It’s just that they’re horrible.
REMAINER: Fine. Take the eggs out. See what happens.
LEAVER: It’s not my responsibility to take the eggs out. Get on with it.
REMAINER: Why should I have to come up with some long-winded incredibly difficult chemical process to extract eggs that have bonded at the molecular level to the cake, while somehow still having the cake?
LEAVER: You lost, get over it.

THERESA MAY: By the way, I’ve started the clock on this.
REMAINER: So I assume you have a plan?
THERESA MAY: Actually, back in a bit. Just having another election.

REMAINER: Jeremy, are you going to sort this out?
JEREMY CORBYN: Yes. No. Maybe.

EU: It’s our cake.

LEAVER: Where’s my omelette? I voted for an omelette.
REMAINER: This is ridiculous. This is never going to work. We should have another vote, or at least stop what we’re doing until we know how to get the eggs out of the cake while keeping the bits of the cake that we all like.

LEAVER/MAY/CORBYN: WE HAD A VOTE. STOP SABOTAGING THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE. EGGSIT MEANS EGGSIT.

REMAINER: Fine, I’m moving to France. The cakes are nicer there.
LEAVER: You can’t. We’ve taken your freedom of movement.

Friends were passing this around on Facebook, attributing it to Drew Collier. I liked it. I assume Mr. Collier launched it into the world to be passed around.

Thursday, November 15, 2018

Democracy gone awry; people demanding change

Brexit is straining the British political system, as it has since the referendum in June 2016. Conservative Party leader Theresa May, up against the pressure of her mandate to effect a divorce from the European Union by the end of March, has brought home a "deal" which nobody likes. This may either somehow win a majority in Parliament or possibly bring down her government. This post is not about the substance of Brexit negotiations; I wouldn't begin to suggest I grasped either the economics or the intra-Brit political implications.

But I'm certainly interested in understanding how the dis-United Kingdom came to vote narrowly to jump ship from the continent. From where I sit, this looks like a self-destructive democratic belly flop, only exceeded by our own narrow election of an incompetent, grafting, petulant narcissist to the US presidency.

And so I turned to Anthony Barnett's The Lure of Greatness. Barnett has campaigned for political reform in Britain for decades and is the founder of the important international portal Open Democracy.

Barnett sees Brexit and the Trump election as fruit of the same poisoned tree: the betrayal of trust by two intertwined national ruling elites which gave us the Iraq war on phony pretexts and a financial crisis which trashed the prosperity of middle classes while sparing the wealthy 1 percent. And so, on both sides of the Atlantic, the people

made a judgement: to roll the dice. ... [There were] two core claims [from] the Leave and Trump campaigns, used to wrap their vile deceits. One: the political system is corrupted, wrong and unacceptable. This is so in the UK and the EU as well as the USA. Two: it can be changed. Knowing the first is true, and the second could be, turned the two campaigns into movements with energy and motivation that maximised their appeal and turnout.

He goes on to point out an underlying truth which easily gets lost (and which we've just seen proved out in the midterm elections):

I am not saying that the system is only or nothing but corrupt, and fixed by money and the machine. Were that the case it would not be possible to change it – and neither Trump or Brexit could have won. It is because the US and the UK are open, crudely democratic, law-based and free, that change is possible.

He goes on to explain the vote in the United Kingdom to leave the EU as the product of the particular shape of government that country has inherited from its imperial past. Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales have emerged from a history of colonial status within Britain and acquired their own representative elected assemblies with "devolved" powers. London has become a fabulously wealthy international business hub, cosmopolitan and little dependent on its English hinterland. Meanwhile, the numerous English people of the English countryside who once turned the map of the planet the red representing Her Majesty's Empire have ended up with no institution of government that is theirs. Parliament in Westminster is the national governing body, not their particular site of power.

When the voters of the UK were asked if they wanted to renew their membership of the European Union, it became a vote on how the country is governed. Different forces, tangible and intangible, were at work. These included immigration, the refugee emergency, the effects of austerity, the outrageous rip-off of the financial crash, the loosening of loyalties thanks to the internet, the undemocratic nature of the EU, the implosion of social democracy. The majority response to these forces in Scotland and Northern Ireland, the second-and third-largest nations of the UK, was to seek closer relations with the EU, with more and better continental solidarity. A similar response came from London, the global city. But across England-without-London, the comeback was the opposite. This is the central fact of the referendum’s outcome.

Britain is a post-empire hybrid. ... English hostility to the European Union is based on a delusion of its influence, linked to a nihilistic sense of the futility of Westminster. Unlike all other parts of the UK and the EU, England has no government of its own.

By being committed to the British Westminster and Whitehall, the English deprive themselves of their own political self-determination. This is the irony. The real foreign threat comes from their British masters. Their attachment to [formerly imperial] Britain prevents the English from realising themselves.

Barnett has many other topics in addition to the British/English democracy deficit that I've highlighted here. He's a social democrat; a critical supporter of a Labour party he doesn't think quite exists; a proponent of recognizing that migration is simply part of historic human nature. His commentary on the Trump phenomenon is both hard to refute -- and just a hair off, like listening to the BBC report on US politics and knowing they've got the emphasis a little wrong, again.

But if you aspire at all to follow the twists and turns that Brexit will create for the our English-speaking cousins over the next few years, The Lure makes an accessible starting point. We too live in an imperial power past its prime. What can we learn from the travails of a kindred democracy further down the post-imperial adjustment path?

Tuesday, May 29, 2018

A very British socialist and a very British socialism

A few years ago, a British friend gave me a "What Would Clement Do?" T-shirt and complimented me that I was the only Yank she knew who might understand it. She was exaggerating my erudition; though I'd heard of British Labour Prime Minister Clement Attlee, I didn't know hardly a thing about him. And so, eventually, I picked up historian John Bew's exhaustive biography, Clement Attlee: The Man Who Made Modern Britain.

Bew advocates vigorously for the historic significance of his subject:

... it is difficult to think of another individual through whom one can better tell Britain's story form the high imperialism of Queen Victoria's Jubilee of 1887, through two world wars, the Great Depression, the nuclear age, and the cold war, and the transition from empire to commonwealth.

Born in the late 19th century into Britain's comfortable middle class, Attlee was on his way to a genteel conservative life via a second tier public (private) school, Oxford, and reading for the bar, when he took a detour into the London slums (Stepney, Limehouse) and emerged a convinced socialist. Amid the frothy political currents of the day, he took up with the pragmatic socialists -- as opposed to the airy intellectuals or dogmatic Marxists. These socialists eventually amalgamated with the trade unions to form the Labour Party. The Great War (1914-18) pulled Attlee into combat; amid the slaughter at Gallipoli and later in Iraq, he was lucky enough to suffer wounds which took him away while his units were decimated. He came out of the war a respected major, a leader of men, and returned to campaigning for socialism in London's East End. He was elected to Parliament in 1922 proclaiming:

"I stand for life against wealth ... I claim the right of every man, woman and child in the land to the best life that can be provided. Instead of the exploitation of the mass of the people in the interests of a small rich class, I demand the organization of the country in the interests of all as a cooperative commonwealth in which land and capital will be owned by the nation and used for the benefit of the country."

... [In those years] socialists may have remained deeply unsatisfied with the situation in post-war Britain, but the point that Attlee was making was that they no longer had any excuse for failing to participate. He threw down the gauntlet to those who believed they were 'above the rough and tumble of a local election', or above the need for compromise on politics. He condemned the "revolutionary idealist" who rejected democratic participation. This type of extremist would "criticise and condemn all methods of social advance that do not directly square with his formulae and will repeat his shibboleths without any attempt to work out their practical application."

The Great Depression of the 1930s with mass unemployment and near starvation among the working class tempted him toward a less 'democratic' radicalism envisioning implementing "socialism by decree" if Labour should ever gain power. But the rise of fascism in Europe changed his views:

the British Labour Party should define itself as standing for democracy over totalitarianism. Whether that totalitarianism was fascist or communist was essentially irrelevant.

It didn't help that he experienced the communists in East End London as violent thugs, all too similar to British fascist Oswald Mosley's followers.

In 1935, Attlee was elected leader of the parliamentary Labour Party. He was thought a weak choice, but had supporters in all factions. He had led his party to support full self-government for India and had lent his support to the fighters of the Spanish Republic, visiting soldiers in that civil war. The party now put forward what was seen as a "moderate" program:

A Labour government would nationalise the Bank of England, coal, electricity, cotton, and transport. Unemployment would be tackled and the means test for welfare would be abolished.

Meanwhile, the Conservative Party in government was appeasing Hitler abroad and failing to bring prosperity at home. As British resistance to the Nazi sweep across Europe crumbled in 1940, the old war horse Winston Churchill came in as Prime Minister and formed a government of national unity, bringing in Labour with Attlee as the party's leader. Bew speculates that for Churchill in that terrible moment,

... if turning Britain socialist was the price of victory, it was one he might be willing to pay.

Meanwhile, Attlee offered his understanding of what Labour's war aims ought to be:

"It would be an error to think changes are only needed in dictatorship countries, or after the war Western democracies can return to their rear positions unaffected..." [Labour was fighting not only against fascism but also] to make "the world safe for the ordinary man and woman of whatever creed or color," and for the "fundamental decencies of life."

Churchill and Attlee worked as successful wartime partners. Attlee's experience in the 1914 war had reinforced his gut level patriotism and given him a sense of the social mobilization required to win an existential national struggle. The Labour ministers were thought to have made essential contributions to war mobilization. And then -- dramatically -- in 1945 just as hostilities were being completed, the British electorate voted the Conservatives out of power and installed the Labour Party with Attlee as prime minister.

The residue of the war greatly assisted Labour in carrying out its program. The nation had become accustomed to a mix of disruption, solidarity and shared sacrifice. Wartime controls on finance and industry meant that it was possible with minimal disturbance to nationalize key economic sectors in accord with long stated aims. And Labour turned the aroused energy of the nation to creating the National Health Service (over the objections of many doctors) and building housing for the returning soldiers. Concurrently, independence finally came to India, signaling the end of empire though further decolonization took another decade and a half.

No British government of the twentieth century was as active, in terms of legislation passed, as the Attlee administration when it came to changing the relationship between state and society.

By 1951, Labour's leaders, largely men (very few women) who had carried the nation through the war against fascism, were quite simply tired. Voters returned the Conservatives to power in that year; Attlee remained party leader until 1955 -- a run of 20 long years at the highest level of British politics.

Obviously, Attlee's career played a huge role in shaping the Britain that endured at least until Margaret Thatcher's Conservative regime (1979-90) and in some ways until today, though its legacy of enlightened social policies is always under assault. He wasn't ever a heroic or larger than life leader like his contemporary Churchill; people tended to underestimate him, but he certainly helped bring change gracefully to a Britain losing its empire and its world position, all for the benefit of its people. Not bad.

One of John Bew's themes in this biography is how Attlee's socialism differed from pretty much all the other variants that thrived in the 20th century. He was not ideological in the common sense.

For Attlee, British socialism had a pre-history which long predated the theories of Karl Marx. [He looked to the writings of Romantic poets, to Percy Blythe Shelley, to John Ruskin, to Edward Morris .... but] ... aesthetic or idyllic socialism could take one only so far. The nation and the state could not be wished away; in fact Attlee came to think of them as positive instruments of change. [He was formed in part by the American Edward Bellamy's forward looking socialist vision ...] "the Golden Age lies before us and not behind us, and is not far away."

Improving conditions for workers, such as wages, working hours, insurance and healthcare, was the first battle the Labour movement should fight. .. while he believed that it was necessary to insert some science into socialism, there was a danger it would become too mechanical and systematized, and lose sight of the citizens it was supposed to liberate. "The besetting sin of the scientific type of social reformer is his failure to make allowance for the idiosyncrasies of the individual."

For an extended time, this British socialism worked for most citizens. Eventually a rapacious modern capitalism replaced it and Labour for a long time lost its moorings, whether in opposition or in government. As the current Conservative Prime Minister Theresa May stumbles through Brexit, Labour has regained much popularity -- can it again find a way to look ahead? "What WOULD Clement Do?"

Saturday, March 24, 2018

Brits strike back against Russian disinformation

Last year around this time, I posted a guide to how to spot "fake news" -- disinformation in the service of authoritarianism emerging from our demagogic president and his GOP enablers. It holds up pretty well.

The Brits are being subjected to a barrage of Russian-origin fake news denying Russian responsibility for the poisoning with a military grade nerve agent of a former spy and his daughter. This propaganda is not so much designed to change minds about "who done it" as to make people feel they cannot possibly know what is true. This is a signature tactic of modern dictatorships -- people get worn out amid the chaos and look away. This is not the same thing as responding to citizens' honest desire for evidence, either. It's noise to drown out understanding.

So the British Foreign Office has struck back not with refutations but with mockery. Enjoy.
And remember this tactic. We need it.

H/t Anne Applebaum.

Sunday, March 18, 2018

How to respond to a vile crime

As every news consumer has heard, on March 4 somebody tried to kill former Russian spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia in Salisbury, England. Prime Minister Teresa May, leader of the Conservative Party, announced that the weapon was a nerve agent only made in Russia. Members of her government have pointed directly at Vladimir Putin. European nations and, more grudgingly, the United States, have denounced the chemical attack. Britain and Russia have carried out tit-for-tat expulsions of diplomats. This is a substantial diplomatic crisis.

Over here on this side of the ocean, we haven't heard much about the response from the Labour Party, the official opposition. That should matter; Labour is nearly as strong with British voters as May's Tories. So what is Labour saying? Their leader, Jeremy Corbyn, laid out his response in the Guardian.

First and foremost, he reassures that his party understands that something very wrong has taken place. And they want it investigated properly.

There can be no one in Britain who is not outraged by the appalling attack on Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia in Salisbury last week. The use of military nerve agents on the streets of Britain is barbaric and beyond reckless. This horrific event demands first of all the most thorough and painstaking criminal investigation, conducted by our police and security services. They have a right to expect full support in their work, just as the public should also be able to expect calm heads and a measured response from their political leaders. To rush way ahead of the evidence being gathered by the police, in a fevered parliamentary atmosphere, serves neither justice nor our national security.

Since Labour is always tarred (mostly inaccurately) by its rightwing opponents with coming from a pinkish, commie-sympathizing, pro-Soviet history, Corbyn bluntly denounces the Russia that is.

... Labour is of course no supporter of the Putin regime, its conservative authoritarianism, abuse of human rights or political and economic corruption. And we pay tribute to Russia’s many campaigners for social justice and human rights, including for LGBT rights. However, that does not mean we should resign ourselves to a “new cold war” of escalating arms spending, proxy conflicts across the globe and a McCarthyite intolerance of dissent. ...

But he points out that Labour does have a policy idea that would seriously punish Russia for its international misdeeds: stop allowing the London real estate and financial markets to act as a haven for Russian billionaires.

... our capacity to deal with outrages from Russia is compromised by the tidal wave of ill-gotten cash that Russian oligarchs – both allied with and opposed to the Russian government – have laundered through London over the past two decades. We must stop servicing Russian crony capitalism in Britain, and the corrupt billionaires who use London to protect their wealth.

Labour voters remain suspicious of the government in this crisis; they and Corbyn remember that a previous government took them to war in Iraq on the basis of intelligence lies. They want the evidence out before the public -- and if the evidence is good, Labour does have a prescription about what the nation ought to do.

I can't help wondering whether our Democratic leaders would be so relatively capable of responding thoughtfully when/if this country confronts a similar crisis. After all, a majority of us believe, with plenty of evidence, that Russia helped give us an unfit president. We don't react well to Ruskies. And our crony capitalist sector is also awash in corrupt Russian money -- just look at who buys those gold-plated Trump Organization digs.

Our Democratic politicians too often stampede easily when told national security is at stake. I find this even more worth thinking through as the Russia investigation pushes closer and closer to Donald Trump. This president would have no scruples against ginning up a security crisis if he thought it might save his hide. We'll be darn lucky if we don't see this, especially before the midterm elections. Democratic leaders better thing ahead about how to calm and critique (and if need be resist), if push comes to shove.

Ditto the last paragraph if Trump tries to quash the Russia investigation. ...

Friday, August 04, 2017

British democratic turbulence and our own

The other day, EP and I were interviewed by a chronicler of the antiwar movement of the '00s. This required me to revisit the strange presidential election of the 2004, when John Kerry, the Democrat trying to unseat George W. Bush, became functionally the candidate of antiwar forces, despite having voted for the Iraq war and offering yet no repudiation that failed endeavor.

British polling is not very good at predicting the outcomes of general elections -- all those obscure constituencies, intra-national currents, and multiple parties go a long way toward to defeating pollsters. But Brits have perfectly good post-election data from The British Election Study afterward, giving pundits and campaigners lots to chew over. Various outlets are now looking at the June 2017 parliamentary election results which ended with a shocking rise in the Labour vote, curbing the Conservatives' majority in Parliament. A piece from the BBC concludes that Brexit -- withdrawal from the European Union -- overwhelmed all other voter concerns. Voters had accepted the 2015 referendum result in which Leave had barely outpolled Remain, but in June were still litigating what Brexit meant: would they get "hard Brexit," cutting all ties and ending free movement of people to and from the continent or would they get "soft Brexit," tailored to continue Britain's trading position and open to the movement of people. The data show that how voters felt about immigration strongly determined how they chose a party.

Despite uncertainty over its position on the single market, Labour was seen as the best bet by those wanting to keep closer ties with Europe.

... One of the reasons Labour did so well among Remainers is that by the time the election was called, the Brexit debate was not so much about Leave or Remain but about how to leave.

... The results reveal a striking correlation between wanting to control immigration and voting Tory on one hand, and wanting access to the single market and voting Labour or Lib Dem on the other.

For example, the Conservatives lead Labour by more than 40 percentage points among those most in favour of full control of immigration, with Labour having a similar lead among those wanting complete access to the single market.

Labour was nominally for Remain in the 2015 referendum, but that never sat well with its older white members, many of whom voted to Leave. Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn seemed a natural anti-European, no enthusiast for his party's nominal position. He certainly is credited with running a strong campaign in the 2017 election. Yet opposition to anti-immigrant currents and affection for a cosmopolitan, open European connection also boosted the Labour vote in the recent voting according to these studies. Multicultural, multiracial London is currently solidly Labour territory.

This all does remind me of the tentative Democratic opposition to the Iraq war in 2004 which became a driving passion within two years. How Britain will sort itself out through the next two years of Brexit remains to be seen. They are not us, but their political system contains (and fails to contain) many of same tensions over race and immigration. As with our party system, popular feelings are poorly reflected by their institutions of democracy. This creates volatility. May decency and justice prevail, there and here.

Wednesday, June 07, 2017

On the eve of the British general election

Now that looks familiar, doesn't it. Young people are evidently pulling one way, the elders another (as of May 30). Nothing strange to us in the U.S. in that.

People who actually know anything about the approaching British vote (not me) seem agreed that Theresa May and the Conservatives (Tories) will win enough of a majority to stay in government, but probably not much enlarge their margin. This wasn't supposed to be how this worked; May called the election expecting to be greatly strengthened, but on the eve of the vote, it doesn't look as if she'd get the wipe out against the opposition Labour Party she hoped for.

In addition to the generation gap, there are familiar elements. Zrinka Bralo, a Bosnian who found refuge in Britain from war, has described how he and other immigrants are struggling for democracy in their new home.

... we often neglect to mention that refugees and migrants are also political, and possessing the same agency to democratically determine their future. This agency is exercised despite migrants often being denied their rights, forced to endure prejudice and degrading treatment and being formally excluded from the democratic process.

We have been citizens somewhere and many are soon to be citizens here. In fact, many refugees ended up fleeing their countries because they risked their lives being citizens in pursuit of justice and democracy. For many refugees and migrants, politics, democracy, voting and civic participation is an essential part of our identity and, without exaggeration, a matter of life and death. Just before the war in Bosnia, I checked myself out of hospital in order to vote in the independence referendum. Not voting was just not an option for 24 year old me.

... When the snap election was announced by the Prime Minister, migrant and refugee communities responded in the best way they knew – through a nationwide mobilisation. Communities seized the opportunity to make this election different by organising everybody to speak out, register to vote and ensure that their voice in heard. Even those who cannot vote were able to work together to ensure that their communities and their interests are not lost in this election. In a clear voice, migrants said that decisions about us should not be taken without us. ... Since April 18, more than 2 million people registered to vote. Many of these will be migrants looking to choose a Government that stands up for them and their communities.

As is so often the case, it looks as if what happens in Britain will be decided by who gets out and votes. Historically, young people and newcomers may have opinions, but they just don't bother to actually cast a ballot. The Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn has been drawing enthusiastic crowds on a platform of free tuition and re-orienting the state toward support for public welfare. Theresa May clearly is uninspiring to many. But pollsters wonder whether all this noise can translate into a Labour win -- or even hold down a Tory majority. Parties depending on young voters seldom reach their turnout goals. Can Britain be different?

Labour has been airing slick ads that make the case to young Brits.
Stephen Bush at the New Statesman opines that this vote could be a repeat of Brexit (and resemble Hillary Clinton's fruitless popular vote victory).

Most of Britain’s great cities – London, Manchester, Liverpool, Edinburgh, Bristol, Glasgow and Newcastle – all voted to Remain. Its smaller cities and towns opted, in the main, to Leave.

Labour’s surge may be similarly geographically limited.

Labour gains where globalization fuels diversity and prosperity, but this may not be enough to overcome the drag among people for whom globalization is not benefit but painful disruption.

We'll see. Pollsters in Britain have a far poorer track record than ours. Their system is harder to model. I'm following @GoodwinMJ and the British edition of The Guardian.

Sunday, June 04, 2017

Dude has his priorities

Grace under pressure.

Friday, February 03, 2017

Of popular sovereignty and collapsing constitutions


Four items briefly noted. Dramatic churn in what we may have thought immutable political arrangements in these days would be easy to miss amid the rush of everyday drama from the Trump regime. Here are some straws in the wind.
  • Last fall, citizens of South Dakota passed new ethics and campaign finance rules by a 52 percent initiative vote. Last week, their Republican dominated legislature and governor threw that measure in the trash can -- and even made it impossible for their voters to bring it back by another initiative.

    An emergency provision means the [repeal] bill would take effect immediately and couldn't be referred back it to the ballot. ...

    Rapid City resident Michelle Smith said before the [legislative] vote that it's wrong that the voters' voice is being overturned. She cast a ballot for the initiative and came to the Capitol to support it.

    "I've spent a lot of time saying, 'Somebody needs to do something,'" Smith said. "I'm somebody."

    So much for government by the people.
  • Meanwhile, in Britain, a vote of the British parliament kicked the legs out from under their several hundred year old "unwritten constitution" when they decided that a narrow national popular vote to leave the European Union must override their historic mandate and prerogative to govern through parliament. Writing at Open Democracy, Adam Ramsey and Anthony Barnett explain:

    ... a referendum which must be respected even if it upturns the views of MPs kills off parliamentary sovereignty. It is the people of Britain who are sovereign now.

    For a democrat, this is a good thing in many ways. It ought to be the people of this country who have the ultimate power to decide on the most important matters. But, here’s the problem. What we can now refer to as the old constitution had rules and procedures and, at least on good days, checks and balances. ...

    If we are to accept the new reality – that the people have spoken and must be heard; that it is us, the citizens of this country, who are the ultimate arbiters, then that means we too need rules and procedures. We need to figure out how we are to organise our new-found power. We need, in other words, a democratic constitution. Because without codification, the abstract idea of popular sovereignty is a path to tyranny. The people must be in charge, but that means we must organize ourselves to ensure minorities are respected, that there are proceedures for us to change our minds, and that the information put before us is honest. ...

    The need is the more urgent since the Scottish National Party won the vast majority of seats from its section of the country and stands against Brexit, for a far more equitable society, and popular sovereignty for the Scottish people exercised through the Scottish parliament. That is, so-called "Great Britain" is breaking up. We probably ought to notice.
  • And then there are manifold questions about the viability of the U.S. constitution. Legal scholars Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson have been discussing this for a decade, long before our 18th century document yielded the present President, elected with a minority of the vote, who recognizes no constitutional restraints. Here are some abbreviated comments by Balkin:

    Demagogues do not usually sneak up unawares. Members of the public often know that demagogues are selfish, unethical, and unscrupulous, but they convince themselves that turning to such leaders is the only way to smash corrupt institutions and solve the country's problems. Once in power, however, demagogues become tyrants, bringing republican government to an end. This is the traditional story of how republics decay and fall. ...How well does the traditional account of the decay of republics match our present situation? The resemblance is altogether frightening. ...

    ... The credibility of a demagogue like Trump stems from his promise to shake up the lethargy of government, to bring change, and to improve people’s lives. The source of his power is also the source of his greatest vulnerability. To defeat him, one must bog him down, divert him, frustrate him, waste his energies. ... ... these kinds of leaders fail because people actively oppose them They fail because their political coalition begins weakened and falls apart in the face of constant political opposition. ... Above all, to defeat a demagogue whose power comes from the promise of change, one must make change difficult, and impede the smooth progress of his Administration’s ambitions.

    Democracy and Dysfunction is absolutely worth reading in its entirety; although written by high-end lawyers, it is accessible to anyone who are willing to invest a little effort.
  • And one more lawyerly contribution to understanding this moment: Mark Graber, in The Normal Politics of Abnormal Presidents takes up what we need to do now that our constitutional order is failing us.

    The normal politics that generated an abnormal president highlight the necessary repairs that must be made to the American constitutional order to prevent Trumpism.  If constitutional order A in the normal course of operation generates constitutional order B and constitutional order B is a terrible regime, constitutional order A has severe design flaws and cannot be restored merely by a temporary expedient that removes a particular manifestation of political outcome B.  ... If Donald Trump were to disappear today, the combination of campaign finance laws, media practices, party politics and sheer bigotry that produced Donald Trump will likely produce some variation on Donald Trump in the foreseeable future. ...

    ... The challenge that the normal politics of abnormal presidents present is finding the resources in the existing constitutional order for upending that regime with the understanding that the means by which this order is upended will likely become the normal politics of the next era.  A military coup that overthrows Mr. Trump provides the foundation for the military coup that overthrows President Elizabeth Warren.  If the left gains power through riots in the streets and general strikes, then opposition to a leftwing government is likely to take the form of riots in the streets and general strikes.  The best solution and the most challenging one is a campaign aimed at mobilizing voters under the most difficult circumstances for mobilizing voters since the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

    I agree profoundly with that last paragraph. Not being a lawyer, I'm also in favor of every popular initiative to impede the demagogue -- strikes, marches, blockades, Congressional call-ins, pray-ins, and modes of popular protest we haven't invented yet -- but we need to use the levers of popular sovereignty as much as possible along the way or we won't like where we arrive.